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THE INTENT DOCTRINE AND CERD:
How THE UNITED STATES FAILS TO MEET ITS
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE
By AUDREY DANIEL 1
INTRODUCTION
Although the United States ratified the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
(hereinafter "CERD" or "the Convention"), it does not further
its human rights objectives. Specifically it fails to address the In-
tent Doctrine, which requires that a plaintiff prove a perpetra-
tor's intent to discriminate to win an equal protection claim. This
doctrine violates CERD's very definition of discrimination.
Utilizing a disparate impact standard of discrimination, CERD
offers broad protections against modern forms of discrimination
such as implicit bias and structural racism. The Intent Doctrine,
in comparison, is unequipped to combat these latent, yet incred-
ibly pervasive types of racial discrimination. Because of this sub-
stantial disconnect between Supreme Court precedent and the
United Nations treaty, the United States is in violation of its
commitment to the Convention and to the ideals set forth
therein. While other party states maintain progressive standards
similar to those laid out by CERD, the United States refuses to
modify its laws to comply with the Convention. It continues to
implement a doctrine that is ill-equipped to remediate contem-
1 This article was written in conjunction with Equal Justice Society, an organ-
ization founded to overturn Washington v. Davis. Special thanks to my fam-
ily, Damien Jovel, Sara Jackson, Brando Starkey, Fabian Renteria, Reggie
Shuford and Eva Paterson for their outstanding input and support.
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porary manifestations of race-based discrimination. This article
will explore how the Intent Doctrine violates the very funda-
mentals of CERD's human rights objectives, and provide sug-
gestions for how civil and human rights advocates can leverage
CERD's language and international mandate to advance anti-
discrimination law in the United States.
Central to this article is the distinction between an "intent"-
based standard and a disparate impact standard. With respect to
race-based discrimination claims, the United States' "Intent
Doctrine" requires that a plaintiff prove that the alleged dis-
criminatory action was done with the specific intention to dis-
criminate based on race. 2 This standard is almost impossible to
prove in contemporary race-discrimination claims.3 Modern dis-
crimination is less likely to be overt or based on explicit racial
animus, and is more often subtle, indirect or even unconscious. 4
The Intent doctrine is incapable of addressing this type of dis-
crimination and has impeded the development of United States
discrimination jurisprudence since its inception. On the other
hand, the disparate impact analysis utilized in CERD focuses on
the effect of an alleged discriminatory act. This broader stan-
dard, (referred to herein as "disparate impact," "effects-based,"
and "indirect discrimination") refocuses the inquiry towards
whether an action actually resulted in discrimination, instead of
whether an actor intended to discriminate. Modern social sci-
ence illustrates that most discrimination functions at a subcon-
scious and structural level. This creates discriminatory effects
even absent any "intent" to discriminate. Consequently, an ef-
fects-based standard is better equipped than the Intent Doctrine
to address contemporary discrimination. The international com-
munity has embraced a disparate impact standard, in large part
to take an effective and proactive stance against racial discrimi-
nation. The United States, however, refuses to comply with its
Volume+, Number 2
2 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
3 See e.g., Mcleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
4 See infra Part II.B.
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obligation as a CERD party to declare a similarly firm stance.
Consequently, the United States fails to effectively address con-
temporary racial discrimination.
Part I of this article describes CERD in depth, concluding that
the United States' commitment to CERD was and remains
largely symbolic. With specific attention to the disparate impact
standard and how it operates, the article discusses the history
and structure of the Convention, as well as the limiting stipula-
tions the United States attached at ratification. In Part II, the
article argues that the Intent Doctrine is not only inadequate to
remedy modern discrimination, but also violates the provisions
of CERD. It explores Washington v. Davis, the 1976 Supreme
Court case that established the Intent Doctrine precedent, and
discusses two types of modern discrimination-implicit bias and
structural racism-to demonstrate how the Intent Doctrine fails
to effectively address racial discrimination in the United States.
The article then focuses on the conflict between the intent and
disparate impact standards, discussing the interaction between
CERD's Enforcement Committee and the United States bodies
charged with effectuating the Convention. Part III highlights the
domestic discrimination standards of other CERD party states
with a focus on the United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa. 5
This section shows that other party states not only comply with
CERD's anti-discrimination obligations, but that they have ex-
plicitly rejected the Intent Doctrine in favor of broader, more
effective discrimination protections. Finally, Part IV discusses
actions that the legal community and the public can take to en-
force CERD's disparate impact standard within the United
States. Specifically, it explores working towards either overturn-
ing Washington v. Davis, or calling for legislation to effectively
implement the provisions of CERD. Overall, this article will
5 These countries were chosen because they are all party states to CERD,
and have considered the intent requirement in their discrimination jurispru-
dence but rejected it for the more effective disparate impact standard of
CERD.
Volume-, Number 2
2-65 THE- INTENT DOCTRINE AND CF-RD
Spring 2-011
3
Daniel: The Intent Doctrine and CERD: How the United States Fails to Meet
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice Z6
demonstrate that through the Intent Doctrine, the United States
does not take its international obligations against racial discrimi-
nation seriously, as opposed to other party states that maintain
far more progressive and effective standards that do comply
with CERD.
PART I: CERD
The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination is one of the most celebrated
and embraced international human rights treaties. Originally
drafted in 1965, this treaty is described as "the most comprehen-
sive and unambiguous codification in treaty form of the idea of
the equality of the races." 6 This section will discuss the history of
CERD, the structure of its language with special attention to its
standard for discrimination and its corresponding enforcement
mechanisms, and the outpouring of support for CERD from the
international community. It will then analyze the limitations set
forth by the United States upon ratification, concluding that
they are so broad that the United States' commitment to CERD
and its purpose was largely a symbolic gesture to the interna-
tional community.
A. History of CERD
In the winter of 1959 to 1960, a sudden surge of anti-Semitic
incidents worldwide created demand for an international con-
vention aimed at eliminating discrimination. 7 In response, the
United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities (hereinafter "the Sub-Com-
mission") adopted a resolution declaring that such events
violated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and recom-
6 Egon Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 996, 1057 (1966).
7 NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 1 (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1980).
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mending specific actions to combat these and similar occur-
rences.8 After the General Assembly approved the resolution, it
undertook to create an instrument by which signatory states
would be required to affirmatively impose measures to alleviate,
and eventually eliminate, discriminatory acts and practices
within the state.9 The resolution, "Manifestation of Racial
Prejudice and National and Religious Intolerance," became the
precursor to CERD.1o
The General Assembly's Third Committee concluded that
two separate conventions would be prepared: one dealing with
the epidemic of religious intolerance and the other with racial
prejudice.11 Because various delegations asserted that issues of
race were more urgent than religious intolerance, the General
Assembly agreed to prioritize the instrument dealing with racial
discrimination. 12
In 1964, the Sub-Commission formulated the language of the
Convention, which "embodied the world community's declara-
tion of an international standard against racial discrimination
and 'drew its primary impetus from the desire of the United Na-
tions to put an immediate end to discrimination against black
8 Schwelb, supra note 6, at 997-98.
9 Id.
10 Michael B. de Leeuw et al., The Current State of Residential Segregation
and Housing Discrimination: The United States' Obligations Under the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 337, 341 (2008).
11 Schwelb, supra note 6, at 999.
12 Id. The "decision to separate the problem of 'religious intolerance' from
that of 'racial discrimination' had been brought about by political undercur-
rents which had very little to do with the merits of the problem. The opposi-
tion to coverage of religious as well as racial discrimination had come from
some of the Arab delegations; it reflected the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addi-
tion, many delegations, particularly those from Eastern Europe, did not con-
sider questions of religion to be as important and urgent as questions of
race." Id.
Volume +, Number 2 Spring 2011
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and other nonwhite persons."' 13 Reflecting the urgency to cre-
ate a convention prohibiting racial discrimination, the General
Assembly quickly and unanimously adopted CERD on Decem-
ber 21, 1965.14 The final version was later depicted as "the inter-
national community's only tool for combating racial
discrimination which is at one and the same time universal in
reach, comprehensive in scope, legally binding in character, and
equipped with built-in measures of implementation."15 As a
mechanism to promote international human rights, the United
Nations created CERD to promote and enforce broad racial dis-
crimination protections within each signatory state.
Once the language of CERD was finalized, it gained instant
support. Upon opening for signature in March of 1966, there
were already twenty-two signatories by the end of June 1966.16
By signing the Convention, signatory states indicated their in-
tention to take steps towards ratification. Signatory states are
prohibited from acting in any way that would defeat CERD's
purpose.17 Today, out of the 192 United Nation Member States,
173 are parties to the Convention. i , Each party state has ratified
the Convention, consenting to be bound by its terms.' 9 In addi-
tion, there are currently five states that have signed but not yet
ratified CERD.20 CERD receives broad support for its human
13 Leeuw, supra note 10, at 342, (quoting Theodor Meron, The Meaning and
Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 283, 284 (1985)).
14 Id.
15 Meron, supra note 13, at 283.
16 Schwelb, supra note 6, at 997.
17 Glossary, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/pagel-en.xml (Last visited
Aug. 1, 2010).
18 United Nations Member States, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/en/members/
index.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). Status: International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
19 Glossary, supra note 17.
20 Status, supra note 18.
Volume -, Number 2
De~aul Journal {:or Social Jus5tice 268
Spring 2011
6
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol4/iss2/3
269 THL INThNT DOCTRINE AND C~lKD
rights objectives, as evidenced by the fact that the vast majority
of the United Nations Member States have become parties and
undertaken to implement its anti-discrimination provisions.
B. Structure of CERD
The Convention is composed of a Preamble and twenty-five
articles. The Preamble sets out the international concerns and
ideals that led to its formation.21 Articles 1 through 7 define ra-
cial discrimination and affirmatively impose an obligation on
states to take steps towards the elimination of all forms of such
discrimination within their jurisdiction.22 Next, Articles 8
through 16 establish a reporting and monitoring scheme de-
signed to ensure states' compliance with CERD.23 Lastly, Arti-
cles 17 through 25 govern the manner by which CERD is
ratified, entered into force, and amended. 24 The main focus of
inquiry here will be Article 1, specifically CERD's definition of
"racial discrimination." In addition, CERD's established en-
forcement mechanisms will be explored and analyzed with re-
spect to the United States' compliance.
i. "Racial Discrimination" Defined
The very first sentence of Article 1 of CERD defines "racial
discrimination" as,
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or prefer-
ence based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, eco-
21 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
22 Id. at art. 1-7.
23 Id. at art. 8-16.
24 Id. at art. 17-25.
Volume -, Numker 22 Spring 2011
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nomic, social, cultural or any other field of public
life .25
Especially relevant in this definition for purposes of this article
is the explicit inclusion of a disparate impact standard, signified
by the phrase "or effect." 26 This standard focuses not on the dis-
criminatory motives of a state actor, but rather on the discrimi-
natory effects of a law or policy without regard to the purposes
behind it. In other words, if a state maintains a law or policy that
was enacted for an entirely non-discriminatory purpose, it still
may be in violation of CERD if it creates a racially disparate
impact.
Article l's drafting history demonstrates that the inclusion of
an effects-based standard was intentional and generally unop-
posed.27 In the initial drafting phase, three versions of Article 1
were submitted to and considered by the Sub-Commission. 28
Only one definition explicitly specified that discriminatory ef-
fects would also constitute violations of the Convention; the
other two were silent on the issue.29 These latter two definitions
could very well have been construed to include such an analysis,
as they substituted the language "purpose or effect" with the
more ambiguous "based on." 30 A working group produced a
version that included the discriminatory impact standard. It was
almost identical to the definition eventually adopted by
CERD.31 The proposed text made its way through the Sub-
Commission, the Commission and the Third Committee before
25 Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added).
26 Id.
27 Lerner, supra note 7, at 25-6.
28 Id. at 25.
29 Id. at 26.
30 Id. at 25-6. "The text proposed by Mr. Abram included in the term 'racial
discrimination' any 'distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of
race, colour or ethnic origin, and in the case of States composed of different
nationalities or persons of different national origin, discrimination based on
such differences.' The text proposed by Mr. Calvocoressi added to the words,
'distinction', 'exclusion' or 'preference' the word 'limitation.' Id.
31 Id. at 26.
Volume +, Number 2 Spring 2011
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finally receiving unanimous approval.32 During that process,
''purpose or effect" remained unchanged while other aspects of
the definition were debated.33 The intent of the drafters is made
clear by the explicit inclusion of an effects-based inquiry in the
language, and strengthened by the lack of debate on the issue.
Thus, from its inception, CERD was broadly designed to protect
against racially discriminatory acts and impacts.
After defining racial discrimination, CERD discusses the obli-
gations imposed upon states with regard to that definition.3 4 Not
only do states have a fundamental obligation to refrain from
supporting or participating in acts of discrimination, they also
have affirmative duties to "take effective measures to review
governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind
or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of cre-
ating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists."35
States must also "prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropri-
ate means, including legislation as required by circumstances,
racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization."3 6
In this manner, CERD requires the party states to take mea-
sures to review its policies in light of the disparate impact defini-
tion, as well as affirmatively take steps to eradicate racial
discrimination within the state.37
ii. Enforcement Mechanisms
In addition to laying out anti-discrimination obligations that
party states must strive to achieve, the Convention establishes
32 Id. at 25-7.
33 Id. at 25-8. For instance, a highly contested element of the definition was
the inclusion of protections based on national origin. Members pointed out
that different translations of national origin signified citizenship while many
did not, so this was clarified in the text. See CERD, supra note 21, at art. 1.
34 CERD, supra note 21, at art. 2.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. See also, Id. at art. 5. (listing specific rights that should be guaranteed
to all without distinction).
Volume -, Number 2 Spring 2011
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four enforcement mechanisms designed to ensure that signatory
states comply with these obligations. First, Article 8 creates a
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (herein-
after "the Committee"), made up of human rights experts who
are tasked with monitoring CERD's implementation.38 The
Committee ensures compliance through mandatory reporting
procedures, and provides states with feedback on how to further
CERD's goals.39 Also, Articles 11 through 13 establish a dis-
pute-resolution mechanism, in cases where one party feels that
another party is not in compliance with CERD's obligations.40
In addition, Article 14 allows parties to recognize the compe-
tence of the Committee to hear complaints from individuals or
groups within the jurisdiction. 41 Finally, Article 22 permits par-
ties to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice to hear disputes between parties over the interpretation
or application of CERD.42 The main procedures utilized in prac-
tice to implement CERD's obligations are the reporting proce-
dures outlined in Article 8, discussed in detail below, and the
individual complaint mechanism of Article 14.43 While signing
and ratifying the Convention implies a commitment to fulfilling
its obligations, many states decline from enforcement through
failing to recognize the competence of the Committee to hear
complaints, and instead submitting only to the mandatory re-
38 Id. at art. 8.
39 Id.
40 Id. at art. 11-13.
41 Id. at art. 14.
42 Id. at art. 22.
43 See Cindy Galway Buys, Application of The International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian
Federation), 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 294 (2009) (discussing the first ever decision
in which the International Court of Justice interpreted and applied CERD in
2008); Human Rights Bodies - Complaints Procedures, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2010)
(describing various inter-state complaint procedures, including that estab-
lished by Articles 11-13 of CERD, and noting that none of those described
have ever been used).
Volume 1-, Number 2 Spring 2011
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porting procedures. Those states that do allow for strong en-
forcement of CERD are reinforcing their commitment to its
goals within their jurisdictions and, in doing so, are promoting
human rights and anti-discrimination ideals more broadly. Much
to its detriment, the United States has resisted recognizing or
implementing many of CERD's established enforcement
mechanisms.
C. United States' Reservations, Declarations
and Understandings
In signing and ratifying CERD, the United States attached
numerous stipulations and declarations to limit the ability to
bring discrimination claims based on the anti-discrimination
standards set forth in CERD. This section will discuss each in
turn. Collectively, these restrictions lead the enforcement mech-
anisms set forth in CERD to have little to no effect in the
United States, and its non-self-executing status disallows enforc-
ing it as domestic law.44 Thus, should a United States policy vio-
late CERD, there are few, if any, avenues for remediation due
to the extensive U.S restrictions.
In 1966, President Johnson signed CERD, but the official rati-
fication process did not begin until 1978.45 At that point, Presi-
dent Carter submitted CERD to the Senate for review, and
included a list of reservations, understandings, and declarations
to accompany it.46 Even then, the limitations proposed would
serve to undermine CERD because they essentially exempted
the United States from any requirement that did not already
44 The interstate complaint procedures outlined in Articles 11-13 have never
been utilized, and thus will not be discussed in detail here. See Complaints
Procedures, supra note 43.
45 Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and Its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People Under
International Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 527, 569 (2009).
46 Id.
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conform to United States law.47 The Senate did not ratify
CERD, and it was not again proposed until the Clinton Admin-
istration.48 Finally, in 1994, President Clinton presented CERD
to the Senate, along with limitations similar to President
Carter's, and it was ratified.49 The political atmosphere in both
the Carter and Clinton administrations was such that both Presi-
dents assured the Senate that ratifying any human rights treaty
would not have a restrictive effect on domestic laws. 50 Thus, the
limitations set forth in CERD ensured that there could be no
effective enforcement of its provisions. It took almost three de-
cades for the United States to ratify one of the leading human
rights treaties. The United States did so only by including broad
limitations that essentially exempt it from requirements of any
proactive efforts to eliminate racial discrimination. The United
States ensured that its citizens do not have an avenue to chal-
lenge discrimination, or inadequate standards such as the Intent
Doctrine, through the application of international human rights
law.
i. Non-Self-Execution
A key declaration accompanying CERD's ratification and
limiting its impact from the outset was "[t]hat the provisions of
47 Id. (citing Terry D. Johnson, Unbridled Discretion and Color Conscious-
ness: Violating International Human Rights in the United States Criminal Jus-
tice System, 56 RUTGERs L. REV. 231, 244 (2003)).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129,
174-5 (1999)("[W]hen President Carter did finally advocate U.S. adherence
to several major human rights treaties, he felt that it was a political necessity
to assure the Senate that the treaty power would not be used to change do-
mestic law. No subsequent administration has challenged the inherited politi-
cal wisdom that such an assurance is the price that must be paid to obtain
Senate consent to ratification of human rights treaties." (citation omitted)).
Volume 4, Number 2 Spring 2011
DePaul Journal for Social Jus5tice Z
12
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol4/iss2/3
275 -4 NNTDTRNANWK
the Convention are not self-executing." 51 This limitation means
that unless the United States creates implementing legislation,
the provisions of the Convention do not allow for a private right
of action in domestic courts.52 Because Congress has not created
any implementing legislation, no individual or organization may
bring a claim in a domestic court to enforce the provisions of
CERD.53 Despite Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, which
states that treaties are the supreme law of the land, by ratifying
CERD as non-self-executing the Senate stripped it of any do-
mestic legal effect. 54 In essence, the United States may effec-
tively opt out of CERD entirely55
During the CERD ratification process at the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, a number of human rights organizations
spoke out against ratifying a non-self executing Convention. 56
Many found that this declaration essentially nullified CERD's
purpose as applied to the United States, that it undermined Ar-
ticle VI of the United States Constitution, and that it sent a mes-
sage that the United States is not committed to CERD's
objectives. 57 First, the NAACP urged the Senate not to include
the declaration, stating, "[T]his device if accepted will deny
large sections of the American people 'the protection of interna-
51 U.S., CERD, Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, BAYEF-
SKY.COM, http://www.bayefsky.conlhtml/usa t2-cerd.php (last visited Nov. 1,
2010).
52 Robin H. Gise, Rethinking McCleskey v. Kemp: How U.S. Ratification of
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination Provides a Remedy for Claims of Racial Disparity in Death Pen-
alty Cases, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2270, 2298 (1999).
53 See Johnson v. Quander, 370 F.Supp.2d 79, 101 (D. DC 2005) (discussing
other Courts' findings that CERD is not self executing).
54 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
55 Nkechi Taifa, Codification or Castration?: The Applicability of the Interna-
tional Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination to the U.S.
Criminal Justice System, 40 How. L.J. 641, 655 (1997).
56 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Rel., 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994).
57 See Id.
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tional human rights law as a supplement and backstop to consti-
tutional protections."58 Similarly, Amnesty International USA
compared the declaration to a shield preventing United States
citizens from fully enjoying those rights guaranteed in the inter-
national human rights treaty.59 It also stated that non-self-execu-
tion is unnecessary if United States law is in fact consistent with
CERD, and that it gives the impression that the United States is
unwilling to give its citizens all available avenues to challenge
discrimination in domestic courts. 60 In opposition to non-self ex-
ecution, the ACLU argued that the Convention's protections
should be immediately enforceable in United States courts in
order to not undermine Article VI of the U.S. Constitution. 61
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights agreed that "it
would undermine one of the principal reasons why the Constitu-
tion made treaties the law of the land ... Incorporation of this
declaration will unnecessarily delay U.S. compliance with some
provisions and set up unnecessary political obstacles to U.S.
compliance generally. '"62
The International Human Rights Group pointed out that the
United States generally urges the enforceability of international
human rights standards in domestic courts in order to strengthen
democracy, and yet, this declaration suggests that the United
States is "afraid to practice what it preaches." 63 Similarly, The
World Federalist Association opposed the declaration, arguing
that the United States should take a lead in emphasizing rule of
law as a means of peaceful dispute resolution.64 Finally, the Mi-
58 Id. at 51 (statement of Wade Henderson, Director, Washington Bureau of
the NAACP).
59 Id. at 65 (statement of the ACLU).
60 Id. (statement of the ACLU).
61 Id. at 62 (statement of the ACLU).
62 Id. at 69, 72 (letter to Senator Pell from Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights).
63 Id. at 52 (statement of William T. Lake, partner, Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering).
64 Id. at 80 (statement of William L. Robinson, Dean, District of Columbia
School of Law).
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nority Rights Group stated, "[t]he effect would be to dilute the
force of the Convention as ratified by the Senate and to call into
question, on an international level, the commitment of the
United States to the elimination of racial discrimination within
its own borders." 65 Despite the urging of these and other human
rights groups, the Senate included this declaration so that the
provisions of CERD are not enforceable in United States
courts. Consequently, claims of racially disparate impact that do
not meet the high-level Intent Doctrine standard, unless other
specific statutes apply, will not be heard in the courts of the
United States. 66
ii. Individual Complaint Mechanism
Another broad limitation set out in the United States' ratifica-
tion was the refusal to recognize the competence of the Commit-
tee to receive and consider individual or organization
complaints. The victims' complaints assert CERD violations by
the United States. 67 Thus, an individual or organization in the
United States is not only precluded from bringing a CERD
claim within the U.S. court system, but is also prevented from
bringing that claim to the Committee. While recognizing the
Committee is voluntary, committing entirely to the Convention,
including all of its enforcement procedures, manifests a state's
willingness to fully address any violation. The Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights declared
that "[t]he ability of individuals to complain about the violation
of their rights in an international arena brings real meaning to
65 Id. at 76 (statement of the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights and
the Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights).
66 Certain statutes provide for a disparate impact standard and therefore
claims based on these statutes would be heard in domestic courts. However,
these claims must fall within certain areas of the law such as voting rights,
leaving other types of racial discrimination to satisfy the requirements of the
Intent Doctrine.
67 Status, supra note 18 (listing those nations that recognize the Committee's
competence, which does not include the United States).
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the rights contained in the human rights treaties." 68 Fifty-three
states are fully dedicated to addressing any internal violations of
CERD by recognizing the competence of the Committee to hear
complaints.69 The United States, however, has declined to recog-
nize its competence. Thus the Committee cannot hear claims
from individuals or organizations in the United States alleging a
disparate impact, or any other, violation of CERD.70
iii. Competence of the International Court of Justice
Another limiting effect of the United States' CERD ratifica-
tion is its failure to consent to the International Court of Jus-
tice's jurisdiction. Consenting to the court's jurisdiction is
necessary in order to be party to any claim arising before the
International Court of Justice under CERD.71 Article 22 allows
for disputes between state parties to be heard by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice if they are not resolved by negotiation or
by the Committee.72 Thus, while states may bring claims against
the United States to the Committee, a practice which has never
been used, it can only be finally resolved by the International
Court of Justice should the United States consent. 73 In the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, the Legal Advisor of
the U.S. Department of State explained that this reservation was
necessary to protect the United States from claims brought for
frivolous or political reasons.7 4 The Minority Rights Group ad-
dressed that concern in the Hearing record, asserting:
Threats or fear of frivolous complaints should not
subvert the United States' greater interests in sup-
68 Complaints Procedures, supra note 43.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 U.S. Reservations, supra note 51.
72 CERD, supra note 21, at art. 22.
73 See U.S. Reservations, supra note 51.
74 Hearing, supra note 56, at 13 (statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal Ad-
visor, U.S. Department of State).
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porting and encouraging international human
rights standards and enforcement mechanisms.
A reservation to Article 22 will raise international
concern regarding the United States' commitment
to the Race Convention, suggesting to parties al-
ready having ratified the Convention that the
United States will not take its obligation to en-
force the Convention's provisions seriously. In
making a reservation to Article 22, the U.S. puts
itself in the company of states such as Libya, Syria,
Cuba, and China, who also have reservations to
Article 22 currently in force. Support has been
shown both at home and abroad for international
dispute resolution through the ICJ.75
Similar to the arguments against ratifying the Convention as
non-self-executing, organizations voiced that this reservation
would undermine the commitment to eliminating racial discrimi-
nation. It sends the message to the international community that
the United States does not consider this a serious obligation.
However, these arguments have not deterred the United States
from insisting on its limitations. The result is that while the
United States considers itself at the forefront of progressive civil
rights policy, there are very few avenues for victims to enforce
CERD's anti-discrimination obligations against the United
States.
iv. Symbolic Nature of Unites States' Ratification
Through its broad limitations of the established enforcement
procedures, the United States has made clear that discrimina-
tion claims, as defined by CERD, will not be enforced within its
borders. The Senate ratified on the condition that no U.S. law
would be amended based on the Convention. The U.S. defini-
tion of discrimination demonstrates how the United States con-
75 Id. at 75 (statement of Minority Rights Group).
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tinually violates the Convention.76 Thus, these restrictive
provisions were put into place so that no individual, group or
state could compel the United States to comply with CERD.77
After waiting almost 30 years to ratify the Convention, com-
bined with the lack of commitment to its enforcement and goals,
reveals to the international community and to its own inhabi-
tants that the United States' commitment to CERD was largely
a symbolic gesture.
By ratifying CERD, the United States did not intend to
amend any of its policies to conform to CERD's obligations.
Through its limiting reservations, declarations and understand-
ings, it ensured that no domestic policy would be scrutinized by
the international community, nor enforced through domestic
courts. While Article 2 of the Convention requires that each
state party proactively takes steps to combat racial discrimina-
tion within its jurisdiction, the United States has refused to ad-
dress a basic difference in the very definitions of racial
discrimination.78 The enforcement mechanisms, the reporting
procedures, the competence of the Committee to hear individ-
ual and organization's complaints, the interstate complaint pro-
cess, and the International Court of Justice demonstrate that
there is little possibility that the United States will address the
troublesome Intent Doctrine.
The United States even prohibits its own citizens from bring-
ing complaints to the Committee. The international community
will not hear or know of legitimate CERD claims from individu-
als within the United States. 79 While the interstate complaint
process is permitted, in which one state may allege a CERD vio-
lation taking place within another state, it has never been uti-
lized.80 If a dispute were not resolved through that process it
76 Sloss, supra note 50, at 174.
77 Id.
78 CERD, supra note 21, at art. 22. See infra Part II.C.
79 See supra Part II.B.ii.
80 See Complaints Procedures, supra note 43.
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would be brought before the International Court of Justice. 81
Given its unwillingness to submit to other enforcement proce-
dures, and its allegation that claims against the United States
would be brought for frivolous or political reasons, it is assumed
that the United States would rarely, if ever, consent to the Inter-
national Court's jurisdiction. 82 Thus, the United States has en-
sured that the international community will not hear claims
from within the United States, nor from other states. To further
reduce the binding effect of CERD provisions, the U.S. domes-
tic courts also lack jurisdiction to hear CERD-based claims.83
Thus, not only is pressure from the international community to
amend the restrictive Intent Doctrine ineffective, but CERD
also has no legal effect within U.S. courts to address this discrep-
ancy. The United States has unmistakably ratified CERD with
no intention of honoring its obligations or goals and this is espe-
cially true with respect to the Intent Doctrine.
The United States ratification of CERD is a symbolic gesture.
The evidence for this is based on the Senate's conditional ratifi-
cation of the CERD that ratification would in no way affect do-
mestic policy, and the Senate's use of limiting language to blunt
available recourses for violations. The United States did not in-
tend to actually comply with CERD's obligations and only rati-
fied the Convention as a hollow attempt to assert its human
rights commitment. The United States' dedication to CERD's
central purpose is lacking, as the Intent Doctrine continues to
limit the United States' ability to address racial discrimination
claims in accordance with the basic objectives of CERD.
PART 11: THE INTENT DOCTRINE
The United States maintains a basic understanding of the na-
ture of racial discrimination that is anachronistic and far nar-
81 See Id.
82 See supra Part II.B.iii.
83 See supra Part II.B.i.
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rower than CERD's definition. As discussed above, the
definition of racial discrimination adopted by the Convention al-
lows for a broad, effects-based disparate impact inquiry as a ba-
sis to assert a claim. In order to succeed in a constitutional claim
of racial discrimination the United States requires that a party
prove either that a law or policy was enacted with the intent to
discriminate, or that an individual's action was motivated by ex-
plicit racial animus. 84 This latter method, established pursuant to
the Intent Doctrine, not only closes the courthouse doors to nu-
merous claims of racial discrimination, but also disregards the
character of modern discrimination. The following section will
discuss the history of the Intent Doctrine, exploring reasons and
examples of why it is incapable of addressing modern discrimi-
nation in the United States. It will then address the CERD
Committee's alarming reaction to the Intent Doctrine, as well as
the United States' refusal to recognize its inadequacies in ad-
dressing racial discrimination.
A. Washington v. Davis
The Supreme Court of the United States created and applied
the Intent Doctrine in 1976, in the landmark case Washington v.
Davis.85 There, a group of black applicants aspiring to become
Washington D.C. police officers alleged that certain recruitment
procedures were racially discriminatory.86 The applicants alleged
that these procedures violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause. 87 Specifically, the applicants offered evidence that a
written personnel test designed to measure verbal skills dispro-
84 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
85 See Id.
86 Id. at 232.
87 Id. at 233 (because the action took place in Washington D.C., the respon-
dents sued based on a Fifth Amendment claim and not the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, which applied only to the states.
However, this did not change the equal protection analysis as applied to the
Fifth Amendment and the ruling applies to Fourteenth Amendment claims).
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portionately excluded black applicants, and that it bore no rela-
tionship to job performance. 88 Thus, the issue before the Court
was whether the racially disproportionate effect of the test, with-
out regard to the police department's intent, constituted a viola-
tion of equal protection. 89
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the test.90 The
personnel test at issue evaluated whether an applicant to the po-
lice force had acquired a specified level of verbal skills.91 The
evidence showed that 57% of black applicants to the police
force failed the test, barring them from the force, whereas only
13% of white applicants failed.92 Challenging the rationale be-
hind the test, which resulted in whites passing at four times the
rate of blacks, the court explained that "absent evidence re-
vealing some other reason for the lopsided failure rates appear-
ing here, it is difficult to imagine how disproportionate effect
could ever be better demonstrated." 93 The appellate court also
noted that the disproportionate impact of generalized intelli-
gence tests is "the result of the long history of educational depri-
vation, primarily due to segregated schools, for blacks."94 After
a finding of disparate impact, the burden shifted, requiring the
police department to show that the test bore a demonstrable re-
lationship to successful performance in the department. 95 The
court deemed any effort of the department to recruit black of-
ficers irrelevant as an explanation for the lopsided figures, and
thus held that the benevolent intent of the department was an
insufficient response to the discriminatory effects of the test.96
Because the police department could not adequately prove the
88 Id.
89 Id. at 229.
90 Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
91 Id. at 958.
92 Id. at 958-59.
93 Id. at 960.
94 Id. at 961.
95 Id. (basing the burden-shifting analysis on the "Griggs Standard" annunci-
ated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
96 Id. at 960.
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test's job-relatedness, the Court of Appeals invalidated the test
based on its clear discriminatory impact.97
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court refocused the
analysis from the test's job-relatedness to the intent of the de-
partment with respect to the creation and administration of the
test.98 The Court of Appeals borrowed the effects-based stan-
dard from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Su-
preme Court argued that the standard does not extend to the
Constitution.99 Despite the fact that the Court had previously
established a disparate impact standard to assess Title VII
claims of employment discrimination, it now refused to extend
those standards to equal protection claims identical in nature.1 00
Rather, the Court created a new framework for evaluating con-
stitutional claims of racial discrimination: the Intent Doctrine.
The Court of Appeals noted that this case perfectly exempli-
fied a policy yielding racially disproportionate effects in viola-
tion of the Constitution.l0 However, the Supreme Court added
a requirement that is virtually impossible to prove and resulted
in a loss for the black applicants. The Supreme Court did not
focus on the fact that the result of administering this test was
that more white applicants were hired to the police force than
black applicants.102 If the effects-based inquiry were employed,
the Court argued, it could invalidate an entire range of statutes
that are burdensome to black people and not to whites. 10 3 In-
stead, the Court shifted its analysis to the state actor's subjective
frame of mind, imposing the additional requirement that the test
be administered with the purpose of discriminating against black
applicants. 0 4 Because the black applicants could not prove that
97 Id. at 965.
98 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
99 Id. at 239.
100 See Id.; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
101 Davis, 512 F.2d at 960.
102 Washington, 426 U.S. at 245.
103 Id. at 248.
104 Id. at 238.
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the test was designed and administered with the specific intent
to discriminate against them based on their race, the Court
found in favor of the police department.1l s This became the first
application of the Intent Doctrine that barred a claim of dis-
crimination that would have otherwise been held valid under a
discriminatory impact framework. It also marked the beginning
of a new era: the regression of anti-discrimination law in the
United States.
B. Perils of the Intent Doctrine
Thus far, this article has examined both the disparate impact
standard utilized by the international community in CERD, and
the Intent Doctrine employed by the United States, as estab-
lished in Washington v. Davis. The former, effects-based inquiry
is better suited to remedy the types of present-day discrimina-
tion prevalent in the United States. Specifically, the Intent Doc-
trine is unequipped to combat either implicit bias or structural
racism, both of which social scientists have found contribute to
vast disparities based on race. These latent forms of discrimina-
tion are deeply rooted in the United States' long history of race-
based discrimination. The element of intent is absent from the
operation of both implicit bias and structural racism. Thus, de-
spite their pervasiveness, neither form of modern discrimination
is subject to claims of unconstitutional racism in the United
States.
i. Implicit Bias
Implicit bias exists in nearly every aspect of society and yet is
largely unintentional. Social science research shows that people
categorize others based on certain biases and stereotypes.10 6
105 Id. at 250.
106 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckon-
ing with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 337 (1987).
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This mental process is a means to efficiently interpret ones' sur-
roundings without having to take the time to deliberate. 0 7 Thus,
people are completely unaware that this "categorization" pro-
cess is even taking place. 10 8
In a social context, social scientists refer to the process of an
individual learning to categorize others based on embedded so-
cietal opinions as "assimilation. '"109 Children at a very early age
perceive the dominant cultural attitudes towards specific races
but are too young to separate their own beliefs from those of the
people around them. 10 Children not only pick up on attitudes
that may be implicit and manifested only through subtle action,
but are also too young to disconnect these feelings from facts.I H
Thus, the child inherits strong attitudes and beliefs about racial
categories without the conscious participation of the child or an-
yone else. Throughout life, every experience that supports these
learned, implicit beliefs will only serve to strengthen them. At
the same time, a person's unconscious will resist interpreting sit-
uations that challenge their ingrained categories unless forced to
do so. 112 Thus, in order to interpret their surroundings, people
generally make quick judgments by categorizing people based
on race, attaching everything they have learned about that spe-
cific race, while remaining largely unaware that this cognitive
process is taking place.
The study of implicit bias has gained prominence as the
United States has moved towards rejecting explicit manifesta-
tions of racism, despite continuing to be plagued with its effects.
While many allege that the United States is now "post-racial,"
clear racial distinctions persist in almost every measure of social
welfare, including education, housing, employment, criminal jus-
107 Id.
108 Id. at 339.
109 Id. at 337.
110 Id. at 338.
M1 Id.
112 Id.
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tice, health care, and transportation." 3 In order to understand
how and whether our subconscious beliefs and behaviors could
perpetuate such discrepancies, social scientists have developed
numerous tests to measure the extent and nature of implicit
bias. The Implicit Association Test (hereinafter "IAT"), hosted
by Project Implicit at Harvard University, measures positive and
negative associations with specific races based on response
time.114 For instance, the subject will be asked to connect certain
positive notions, such as laughter or peace, with white people,
and negative concepts, such as evil or agony, with black peo-
ple. 15 While most respond quickly to this relatively simple task,
response time is almost always increased when the subject is
asked to then connect the positive concepts with black people
and the negative ones with white people." 6 This slower response
time reflects people's unconscious reluctance to challenge im-
plicit biases about race.117 Available online since 1998, the IAT
has compiled extensive data about racial preferences, all indicat-
ing that implicit bias is very much prevalent in today's society.',,
In fact, more than two-thirds of test takers register bias towards
stigmatized groups. 119 Of whites and Asians who take the test,
75-80% demonstrate an implicit preference for whites over
blacks. 120
113 See Reginald Shuford, Why Affirmative Action Remains Essential in the
Age of Obama, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 503 (2009); Eva Paterson, Kimberly
Thomas-Rapp, & Sara Jackson, Id, the Ego and Equal Protection in the 21st
Century: Building Upon Charles Lawrence's Vision to Mount a Contemporary
Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175 (2008).
114 Project Implicit, IMPLICIT.HARVARD.EDU, https://implicit.harvard.edu/
implicit (last visited August 16, 2010).
115 General Information, PROJECT IMPLICIT.NET, http://www.projectimplicit.
net/generalinfo.php (last visited August 16, 2010).
116 Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scien-
tific Foundation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 952-53 (2006).
117 Id.
118 General Information, supra note 115.
119 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 116, at 957-58.
120 General Information, supra note 115.
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A 2004 study regarding implicit bias in hiring processes illus-
trates the practical effects of these findings.121 In this study, ficti-
tious resumes were sent in response to help-wanted ads in
Boston and Chicago, and each was randomly assigned a stere-
otypical white or black name. 122 Across industry, occupation and
employer size, the white-sounding names received 50% more
callbacks despite otherwise identical resumes. 123 It is fair to as-
sume that most, if not all, of those employers did not consciously
make the decision to respond to white applicants and not black
applicants. 124 Rather, their implicit negative biases towards the
black applicants guided their actions.
It is clear from the IAT that implicit bias is powerful, wide-
spread, guides people's actions, and perpetuates the racial dis-
parities present in the United States today. In fact, the IAT
demonstrates that implicit bias measures are significantly better
at predicting people's actual behavior than explicit bias mea-
sures (i.e., whether or not someone considers themselves to be
prejudiced towards particular groups).25 However, because
people are not making intentional decisions based on explicit
racial animus, but rather based on learned, unconscious stereo-
types, the Intent Doctrine is powerless to combat implicit bias.
ii. Structural Racism
Structural racism is yet another framework for understanding
modern racism and examining how racism is woven into the
very fabric of our society. Studies on structural racism examine
how entire systems can function to discriminate through institu-
tionalized practices and procedures, often built in over genera-
121 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004).
122 Id. at 991.
123 Id. at 992.
124 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 116, at 966.
125 Id.
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tions.126 Here, a discriminatory effect is not traced back to a
single, specific action but rather is understood to result from the
cumulative impact of interactions within a discriminatory system
or set of systems. 127 For instance, housing discrimination, itself a
product of deeply embedded structural racism, is not an isolated
phenomenon of residential segregation, but is also connected to
discrimination in other systems, such as education and criminal
justice.12 8 A child who is geographically isolated from a decent
school system may not only receive a sub par education, but is
also more likely to get arrested and become part of the criminal
justice system. 129 These interactions between systems perpetuate
a vicious cycle of discrimination, though they do not depend on
a single, intentional act to initiate the injustice.130 Because this
type of embedded racism does not focus on direct causation, but
rather results from circumstances that cumulatively cause racial
disparities, the remedy cannot rely on a finding of fault. 131
A systems approach changes the focus from as-
signing culpability to solving a problem and re-
dressing a harm. Parties may be called upon to
address harms they may not have directly caused
or intended to cause. In many cases, these harms
were predictable or foreseeable, even if they were
unforeseen in fact. 132
Addressing the causes and effects of racial disparities is a
preferable approach to the Intent Doctrine, as discrimination re-
sults in an appreciable harm whether intended or not. The D.C.
Court of Appeals in Washington v. Davis alluded to this concept
when it discussed how the history of educational segregation
126 John A. Powell, Structural Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John
Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 796 (2008).
127 Id. at 796.
128 Id. at 796-97.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 797.
131 Id. at 798.
132 Id.
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was affecting the test scores, and in turn affecting employ-
ment. 133 While invalidating the written personnel test alone
would not have alleviated the entrenched cycle of racial dispar-
ity, ruling that the disparate impacts of the test constituted dis-
crimination could have impeded the cycle and contributed to an
overall less racially imbalanced system. The police department
would have been tasked with creating a fairer test, which would
ultimately have contributed to a more diverse system of employ-
ment opportunity. In turn, this outcome would hinder a cycle of
structural exclusion by resulting in greater opportunity for mem-
bers of historically marginalized groups. Thus, utilizing an ef-
fects-based inquiry would enable the courts to address systemic
racial disparities closer to their root, whereas focusing on the
intent of the actor leaves the discriminatory system fully intact.
iii. McCleskey v. Kemp
Perhaps most illustrative of the devastating effects of the In-
tent Doctrine is the Supreme Court case McCleskey v. Kemp.13 4
In this case, the Court held that despite clear evidence of racial
disparities in capital sentencing, suggesting both implicit bias
and structural racism, a death row inmate must demonstrate
that his or her sentence was issued with the intent to discrimi-
nate based on race. 135
Warren McCleskey, a black, death row inmate, alleged that
his Equal Protection rights were violated during sentencing.1 36
In support of his claim, McCleskey presented a study on the link
between race and capital sentencing, which incorporated two
statistical inquiries based on over 2,000 murder cases in Georgia
133 Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
134 See Mcleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
135 Id. at 297.
136 Id. at 286. McCleskey had been found guilty of two counts of armed rob-
bery and one count of murder of a white police officer in 1978. He was then
sentenced to death based on the murder charge. In addition to his 14th
Amendment claim, he also brought an 8th Amendment claim. Id. at 283-86.
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during the 1970s.137 Among other findings, the study demon-
strated that the death penalty was assessed in 22% of cases in-
volving black defendants and white victims, and just 1% of those
involving black defendants and black victims.138 It also found
that defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times
more likely to receive the death penalty than those charged with
killing black victims. 139 The Court, however, stated that in order
to prevail on his Equal Protection claim, McCleskey must prove
that during his own sentencing, the decision-makers intended to
discriminate against him based on his race.140 Also, in response
to McCleskey's claim that the state violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by enacting and implementing this capital punish-
ment scheme, the Court declared that "[f]or this claim to
prevail, McCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia Legis-
lature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because
of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect."'14 Requiring
McCleskey to prove that those involved in the legislative pro-
cess sentenced him to death because of his race effectively cre-
ated an insurmountable barrier to his claim. Furthermore, the
court defended its ruling by arguing that McCleskey's claim to
proceed would open a floodgate of Equal Protection claims
based on discriminatory impact in the criminal justice system. 142
Ultimately, McCleskey was not able to prove that the state cre-
ated or implemented its death penalty statute with the purpose
of racially discriminating against him, and his claim was
denied. 143
137 Id. at 286-87. The Baldus study, named after Professor David Baldus,
took into account 230 nonracial variables that could otherwise explain the
disparities. The Court accepted the validity of the study. Id.
138 Id. at 286.
139 Id. at 287.
140 Id. at 292.
141 Id. at 298.
142 Id. at 315-16.
143 Id. at 320.
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McCleskey demonstrates the disconnect between the United
States' approach to evaluating discrimination and the manner by
which discrimination actually operates. The study relied upon in
McCleskey was a disturbing evaluation of the death penalty in
1970s Georgia. The study relied on disparate impact evidence to
demonstrate the clear existence of implicit bias and structural
racism within Georgia's criminal justice system. The stark dis-
parities in the capital system reflected the implicit biases of the
juries, prosecutors, lawmakers, and the ingrained institutional
racism in 1970s Georgia. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, dissented:
[I]t would be unrealistic to ignore the influence of
history in assessing the plausible implications of
McCleskey's evidence. '[A]mericans share a his-
torical experience that has resulted in individuals
within the culture ubiquitously attaching a signifi-
cance to race that is irrational and often outside
their awareness.'. . . The Georgia sentencing sys-
tem... provides considerable opportunity for ra-
cial considerations, however subtle and
unconscious, to influence charging and sentencing
decisions. History and its continuing legacy thus
buttress the probative force of McCleskey's statis-
tics. Formal dual criminal laws may no longer be in
effect, and intentional discrimination may no
longer be prominent. Nonetheless, as we acknowl-
edged in Turner, "subtle, less consciously held ra-
cial attitudes" continue to be of concern, and the
Georgia system gives such attitudes considerable
room to operate. The conclusions drawn from Mc-
Cleskey's statistical evidence are therefore consis-
tent with the lessons of social experience.1 44
144 Id. at 332-34 (citing Lawrence III, supra note 106 and Turner v. Murray,
46 U.S. 28, 35 (1986)).
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Despite the repercussions of Georgia's historical discrimina-
tion, the Court challenged McCleskey to find some type of
"smoking gun" evidence demonstrating the state's intent to dis-
criminate against him. In all likelihood, this evidence never
existed.
Through McCleskey, the Supreme Court reinforced the Intent
Doctrine. The Supreme Court did not allow for broad constitu-
tional discrimination protections and denied McCleskey's claim,
effectively denying any similar claim regarding the discrimina-
tory implementation of criminal justice.145 The consensus of the
international community is that evidence of disparate impact,
such as in McCleskey, should trigger a violation of equal protec-
tion. The Intent Doctrine alone does not offer broad enough
protections against more subtle, yet incredibly pervasive forms
of contemporary racial discrimination. 146
C. The Conflict Between CERD and the Intent Doctrine
As discussed previously, the international community has em-
braced a broad, effects-based standard for evaluating discrimi-
nation claims, while the United States continues to implement a
narrower, intent-focused standard. Despite being a party state
to CERD, the United States does not recognize this conflict.147
Nor has it fulfilled its obligation to address this discrepancy,
even after the Committee recommended that it do so.148 Instead,
the United States claims that the Intent Doctrine is virtually the
same as the disparate impact standard used in CERD, essen-
tially refusing to respond to the Committee's concern. 149
145 Gise, supra note 52, at 2287 (referring to Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134
(7th Cir.) and Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 851 F.2d
1307 (11th Cir. 1988), both of which relied on McCleskey).
146 See infra Part II.B.
147 See infra Part I.C.
148 See infra Part I.C.
149 See infra Part I.C.
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The United States first acknowledged the potential conflict
between CERD's disparate impact standard and the Intent Doc-
trine upon ratification.150 On May 11, 1994, the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations held a hearing to discuss the potential
ratification of CERD.151 There, the Acting Secretary of the De-
partment of State inserted into the record an official analysis of
CERD in support of ratification, much of which was later
adopted in reporting to the CERD Committee.15 2 In this lengthy
memorandum, the Secretary recognized the obligation in Arti-
cle 2 that requires state parties to "amend, rescind or nullify any
laws and regulations" that have the effect of "creating or perpet-
uating racial discrimination. '" 15 3 In response, he discussed certain
federal civil rights statutes that have broader protections than
those offered by the Intent Doctrine.154 However, the statutes
mentioned only deal with discrimination in specific situations,
such as voting. Thus, the statutes do not offer the broad dispa-
rate impact protections in all instance of discrimination as laid
out in CERD. He then discussed the Intent Doctrine, citing
Washington v. Davis and noted that only intentional discrimina-
tion is prohibited under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
as well as 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1982.155 In order to reconcile
CERD's obligations with the United States' existing discrimina-
tion standards, the Secretary simply stated that disparate impact
is taken into consideration when evaluating intent. 56 However,
150 See Hearing, supra note 56.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 22-35 (statement of Strobe Talbott, Acting Secretary, Department
of State).
153 Id. at 33 (referring to CERD, supra note 21, art. 2).
154 Id. (mentioning, specifically, the disparate impact standard in the Voting
Rights Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Federal Regulations
Implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Fair Housing
Act).
155 Id.
156 Id. "Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose exists de-
mands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of in-
tent as may be available." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). Disparate impact may provide
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he conceded that in most cases adverse effect is not determina-
tive, but rather the court will consider statistical disparities
along with other evidence that may collectively demonstrate in-
tent.1 5 7 He proceeded to essentially equate the Intent Doctrine
with CERD's effects-based standard.15s In short, he reasoned
that the U.S. was actually in compliance with CERD based on
the interpretation that actions having an "unjustifiable disparate
impact" included unnecessary actions that caused significant sta-
tistical disparities. 59 The Secretary concluded that the Intent
Doctrine encompassed all of those types of actions, implying
that they were necessarily intentional.16 ° In making this determi-
nation, the Secretary cited to an excerpt from the Committee's
General Recommendations, saying "[i]n seeking to determine
whether an action has an effect contrary to the Convention, it
will look to see whether that action has an unjustifiable dispa-
rate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent,
or ethnic origin."161 The Secretary interpreted this to mean that
prohibited discrimination, as applied to race-neutral practices, is
that which creates statistically significant racial disparities and is
also unnecessary. 162 He then concluded that given such an expla-
an important starting point for that inquiry. Id. Indeed, where racial dispari-
ties arising out of a seemingly race-neutral practice are especially stark, and
there is no credible justification for the imbalance, discriminatory intent may
be inferred. See Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). In most cases,
however, adverse effect alone is not determinative, and courts will analyze
statistical disparities in conjunction with other evidence that may be proba-
tive of discriminatory intent. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67. If the
totality of the evidence suggests that discriminatory intent underpins the
race-neutral practice, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify that prac-
tice. Id. at 271 n.21 (citing Mt. Healthy City School Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle. 429
U.S. 274 (1977)).
157 Hearing, supra note 56, at 33 (statement of Strobe Talbott, Acting Secre-
tary, Department of State).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 34.
161 Id. at 33.
162 Id.
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nation for CERD's definition of discrimination, CERD does not
impose any obligations on the United States that are contrary to
existing law.16a Essentially, this leap of logic alleges that show-
ings of disparate impact are only unjustifiable if they are inten-
tional. While not entirely sound, the United States later used
this same reasoning in response to the Committee's recommen-
dations to eliminate the Intent Doctrine.
According to protocol, each state party must submit regular
reports to the Committee regarding its compliance. The Com-
mittee then issues observations based on these reports. In its ini-
tial report submitted in 2000, the United States discussed the
history of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, focusing on the
Equal Protection Clause. 164 In over a page, the report discussed
the Equal Protection Clause from its inception through present
day, cited a total of twelve decisive cases but failed to mention
Washington v. Davis or the Intent Doctrine.165 The majority of
the cited cases demonstrate strong protections against racial dis-
crimination, and yet one of the most damaging rulings to those
protections is noticeably absent. 166 Later in the report, however,
the Intent Doctrine is addressed, and the United States offered
almost an identical response to the Secretary's reasoning dis-
cussed above. 167 Similar to the Secretary's analysis, this initial
report concluded that the Intent Doctrine is consistent with the
obligations imposed by CERD.168
Despite these assurances made by the United States, in the
Committee's response to the initial report it declared its concern
with the Intent Doctrine:
163 Id. at 33-34.
164 Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention:
United States of America, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1, at 23-4 (Sep. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100294.pdf.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 58.
168 Id.
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The Committee draws the attention of the State
party to its obligations under the Convention and,
in particular, to article 1, paragraph 1, and general
recommendation XIV, to undertake to prohibit
and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its
forms, including practices and legislation that may
not be discriminatory in purpose, but in effect.
The Committee recommends that the State party
take all appropriate measures to review existing
legislation and federal, State and local policies to
ensure effective protection against any form of ra-
cial discrimination and any unjustifiably disparate
impact. 169
Here, the Committee is essentially rejecting the United
States' argument that it is in compliance with the obligations re-
lating to CERD's definition of racial discrimination. The Com-
mittee explicitly recommends that the United States take action
towards prohibiting and eliminating not only intentional racial
discrimination, but also discrimination based on an unjustifiably
disparate impact.170 In order to do so, the Committee recom-
mends that the United States eliminate the requirement of
showing intent to prove discrimination under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause so that disparate impact claims may be addressed. 171
Thus, to be in compliance with the obligations imposed by
CERD, the Intent Doctrine must be overruled.
In its next report in 2007, the United States again argued that
based on the "unjustifiable disparate impact" language of Gen-
eral Recommendation 14, the Intent Doctrine is in compliance
169 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: United States of America, U.N. Doc A/56/18, 376 (Aug. 14,
2001), available at http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/international/shosh
one/documents/36CERDConcObs.pdf. This document also alludes to the ex-
istence of implicit bias and structural racism as residual effects of United
States' history. See Id. at 374.
170 Id. at 376.
171 Id.
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with the obligations imposed by CERD's definition of racial dis-
crimination.172 This report stated that the United States would
address the Committee's concerns about the initial report, yet it
essentially presented, verbatim, the same reasoning as the initial
report. 173 This report also noted that General Recommendation
14, elaborating on CERD's definition of discrimination, is
merely recommendatory in nature. 174 While this may be true,
Recommendation 14 does not relieve the obligations imposed
on the United States as a party state to the Convention. The
General Recommendations are a guide to specific aspects of
CERD's language and implementation, and the fact that they
are not mandatory in nature is inconsequential to the obliga-
tions set forth in the language of CERD itself. Thus, the 2007
report in no way furthers the argument that the Intent Doctrine
is consistent with the obligations set forth in CERD.
Not surprisingly, the Committee's response, the most recent
to date, emphasized the very same concern over the Intent Doc-
trine. However, this time the Committee was even more explicit
than before and listed intent as its first concern:
The Committee reiterates the concern expressed
in paragraph 393 of its previous concluding obser-
vations of 2001 that the definition of racial dis-
crimination used in the federal and state
legislation and in court practice is not always in
line with that contained in article 1, paragraph 1,
of the Convention, which requires States parties to
prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in all
its forms, including practices and legislation that
may not be discriminatory in purpose, but in ef-
172 Periodic Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concerning the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N.
Doc CERD/C/USA/6, 106 (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/docu
ments/organization/83517.pdf.
173 Id. at 121.
174 Id. at 106.
Volume , Number 2 Spring 2Oll
36
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol4/iss2/3
fect. In this regard, the Committee notes that indi-
rect - or de facto- discrimination occurs where an
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice
would put persons of a particular racial, ethnic or
national origin at a disadvantage compared with
other persons, unless that provision, criterion or
practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim
and the means of achieving that aim are appropri-
ate and necessary (art.1 (1)).
The Committee recommends that the State party
review the definition of racial discrimination used
in the federal and state legislation and in court
practice, so as to ensure - in light of the definition
of racial discrimination provided for in article 1,
paragraph 1, of the Convention - that it prohibits
racial discrimination in all its forms, including
practices and legislation that may not be discrimi-
natory in purpose, but in effect. 175
Here, it is clear that the Committee again rejected the United
States' argument that it is in compliance with CERD. Not only
did the Committee reiterate its concern regarding the Intent
Doctrine, but it also went into even greater detail explaining
specifically how CERD's definitions of discrimination differ
from those applied by U.S. courts. By characterizing de facto
discrimination specifically, the Committee emphasizes that the
United States is failing to meet its obligation to prohibit such
discrimination. Again, the Committee is explicitly calling atten-
tion to the insufficiencies of the Intent Doctrine, both as it ap-
plies to the United States' party state obligations, and to its
protections against discrimination, generally.
This reporting process demonstrates not only that the interna-
tional human rights community has grave concerns over the
175 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: United States of America, U.N. Doc CERD/C/USA/CO/6, 2
(2008).
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United States' implementation of the Intent Doctrine, but also
that the United States does not take those concerns seriously.
The fact that the Committee raised this issue multiple times
shows that the Intent Doctrine poses a severe threat to the im-
plementation of CERD in the United States. However, the
United States repeatedly offered the same erroneous argument
that the Intent Doctrine complies with CERD, as opposed to
taking steps to actually be in compliance. This demonstrates a
conscious unwillingness on the part of the United States to meet
its treaty obligations. In order to reconcile this conflict, the
United States must recognize that the Intent Doctrine can not
and does not comply with the internationally accepted definition
of racial discrimination set forth in CERD.
PART III: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
At this point, this article has discussed how the United States
has not taken its obligations as a party state to CERD seriously,
specifically with respect to the Intent Doctrine. While other
party states are by no means free from racial discrimination,
their broad discrimination standards resemble the disparate im-
pact standard espoused by CERD and therefore provide
broader protections against discrimination. In contrast, the In-
tent Doctrine not only fails to live up to the international CERD
standard, but also fails to provide the broad discrimination pro-
tections that other states grant through their own domestic
laws. 176 This section will explore the disparate impact standards
of the United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa, focusing
particularly on how they relate to and offer broader protections
than the United State's Intent Doctrine.
176 See infra Part III.A-C.
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A. The United Kingdom
As a member of the European Union, the United Kingdom is
required to comply with its Racial Equality Directive, which ap-
plies a disparate impact standard broadly to the areas of em-
ployment, education, social protection including social security
and healthcare, and access to the supply of goods and services,
including housing.177 The language in this directive reads:
For the purposes of this Directive, the principle of
equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no
direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or
ethnic origin. . .indirect discrimination shall be
taken to occur where an apparently neutral provi-
sion, criterion or practice would put persons of a
racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage
compared with other persons, unless that provi-
sion, criterion or practice is objectively justified by
a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that
aim are appropriate and necessary. 178
The Directive mandates that each European Union member, in-
cluding the United Kingdom, implement a discrimination stan-
dard that explicitly includes indirect discrimination. 179 The
United Kingdom has complied with this obligation through its
Race Relations Act. 180
The United Kingdom's Race Relations Act sets out a broad
disparate impact standard, pursuant to the European Unions
Racial Equality Directive. 181 Enacted in the same year that the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis, the Act pro-
tects from indirect discrimination in areas such as employment,
177 See Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22 (EC).
178 Id.
179 Maxine Sleeper, Anti-discrimination Laws in Eastern Europe: Toward Ef-
fective Implementation, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 177, 186 (2001).
180 See Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74 (U.K.).
181 Id.
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the provision of goods and services, education and public func-
tions. 182 These areas are interpreted broadly, so that the
CERD's mandate of implementing a uniform disparate impact
standard is met.183 Regarding the relative competance of these
standards, one scholar argues, "Britain has developed a new ap-
proach that incorporates theories of unconscious and institu-
tional discrimination. American policymakers should recognize
the wisdom of the British example and authorize courts to adju-
dicate claims of discrimination employing the insights provided
by these theories." 18 4
Thus, the United Kingdom has met the requirements of both
CERD and the Racial Equality Directive with respect to its dis-
parate impact standard. The United Kingdom is therefore better
equipped than the United States to combat contemporary forms
of racial discrimination.
The Race Relations Act also applies a model of anti-subordi-
nation aimed at eliminating racial discrimination in general, as
opposed to the United States' anti-discrimination model that
seeks to only remedy specific instances of discrimination. 185 This
progressive shift is evidenced by the Act's mandate that certain
public bodies monitor their own discriminatory impact even
before any claim has been brought. 18 6 Public bodies are required
to regularly self-evaluate their racial impacts, and if statistically
182 Id.
183 See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land, U.N. Doc. CERD/A/58/18 (2003). The Committee's most recent Con-
cluding Observations did not make any mention that it was dissatisfied with
the disparate impact standard as it is applied there. Thus, it can be inferred
that the broad application of the standard is in compliance with the obliga-
tions of CERD.
184 Leland Ware, A Comparative Analysis of Unconscious and Institutional
Discrimination in the United States and Britain, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
89, 156 (2007).
185 Id. at 150.
186 Id.
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significant imbalances are found, they must be addressed. 18 7 This
self-evaluation was put into place to ensure that latent discrimi-
nation, such as implicit bias and structural racism, does not con-
tinue simply because a victim has failed to file suit. 188 This
approach, aimed at preventing discrimination within the system,
is far better equipped to impede and eventually eliminate racism
than is the Intent Doctrine.
Given the United Kingdom's disparate impact standard, com-
bined with the self-evaluation requirement, the United King-
dom is far more dedicated to CERD's goal of eliminating racism
than the United States. In the United Kingdom, public bodies
monitor themselves to ensure there is no racially disparate im-
pact of their actions, and address them if they exist. In the
United States, however, a victim must not only allege discrimi-
nation, but also must meet a far higher burden that does not
account for implicit or structural forms of bias and discrimina-
tion. This creates difficulty because many victims of discrimina-
tion do not have the means to bring suit, but in most cases even
if they did the standard bars them from an adequate remedy.
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has exceeded its Euro-
pean and international obligations by instituting this self-evalua-
tion in furtherance of its anti-subordination goals. Thus, the
United States should take guidance from these broad discrimi-
nation protections offered by the United Kingdom.
B. Canada
Canada has also passed a number of anti-discrimination mea-
sures, including section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, the section of the Constitution dealing with
equality rights in the application and operation of federal law. 8 9
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982, ch. 11, s. 15(1) (UK).
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To protect against private discrimination, Canada also passed a
Human Rights Act that applies to all federally regulated indus-
tries, such as airlines and banks.1 90 Also, each province has
passed its own legislation to protect against discrimination in or-
der to supplement the federal acts that cover only the federal
government and federally regulated industries.191 The Supreme
Court of Canada has imposed a broad, disparate impact stan-
dard for all discrimination jurisprudence, thus applying the ef-
fects-based standard to both private and governmental
discrimination.192
The Canadian Constitution guarantees equality rights in the
application or operation of the law, and was interpreted by the
Supreme Court of Canada to evaluate discrimination using a
disparate impact standard.193 Section 15 of the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms' that deals with equality rights,
states: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
or mental or physical disability."' 94
Tasked with interpreting how discrimination under this provi-
sion of the Canadian Constitution should be defined, the Su-
preme Court of Canada explicitly rejected the Intent Doctrine
standard for the more inclusive effects-based standard.195
190 See Canadian Human Rights Act, c. 33, s. 1 (1976).
191 CATERINA VENTURA, FROM OUTLAWING DISCRIMINATION TO PROMOT-
ING EQUALITY: CANADA'S EXPERIENCE WITH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGIS-
LATION 4 (1995), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/
migrant/download/imp/imp06.pdf.
192 See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.R. 143
(Can.).
193 See Id.
194 Canadian Charter, supra note 179, at Sec. 15.
195 See Andrews, [19893 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
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The Supreme Court of Canada contemplated the definition of
discrimination in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.196
Andrews, a British citizen, permanently residing in Canada with
a law degree from Oxford, was prohibited from practicing law
because he was not a Canadian citizen.197 The issue before the
Court was whether this restriction violated the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms.198 The Court looked to its own in-
terpretation of the federal and provincial human rights acts and
explained that intent is not required because anti-discrimination
jurisprudence should focus on providing relief for victims, and
not on punishing the discriminator. 1 99 The Court explained that
intent is not required because anti-discrimination jurisprudence
should focus on providing relief for victims, and not on punish-
ing the discriminator.200 Further justifying the use of the effects-
based standard, the Court went on to discuss the need to rem-
edy systemic discrimination. 20 1 Therefore, the inquiry focused on
the effects of the law prohibiting non-citizens from practicing
law.2 0 2 The Court found that despite the lack of evidence that
this restriction was imposed intentionally to discriminate, the ef-
fect alone violated the equality rights of Andrews under the Ca-
nadian Constitution.203 Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada
applied a disparate impact analysis to the governmental discrim-
ination section of its Constitution. The Court borrowed from its
analysis of the federal and provincial human rights acts.204 The
disparate impact analysis is well-established law as evidenced by
196 See Id.
197 Id. at para. 2.
198 Id.
199 Id. at para. 19.
200 Id. (citing Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985]
S.C.R. 536, 551).
201 See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.R. 143
(Can.).
202 See Id.
203 See Id.
204 See Id.
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its widespread application to both the Constitution and the
human rights acts.
Through the disparate impact standard imposed on its various
governing bodies, Canada has substantial protections that com-
ply with its CERD anti-discrimination obligations.20 5 Likewise,
in its analysis of an ideal definition of discrimination, Canada
explicitly discusses the shortfalls of the Intent Doctrine, arguing
that it is inappropriately aimed at punishing the discriminator
instead of making the discriminated victim whole again.206
Drawing on the more progressive aims of addressing structural
racism and remedying victims, Canada's discrimination defini-
tion is better equipped than the U.S. Intent Doctrine to further
the goals of CERD.
C. South Africa
Following its oppressive apartheid era, South Africa adopted
a new Constitution in 1996.207 The Bill of Rights of this new
Constitution reads:
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds,
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital sta-
tus, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orienta-
tion, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language and birth.. .No person may un-
205 See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination: Canada, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (2007). The
Committee's most recent Concluding Observations did not make any men-
tion that it was dissatisfied with the disparate impact standard as it is applied
there. Thus, it can be inferred that the broad application of the standard is in
compliance with the obligations of CERD.
206 See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.R. 143
(Can.).
207 S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
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fairly discriminate directly or indirectly against an-
yone on one or more grounds [above].208
This broad equality standard includes language prohibiting in-
direct discrimination. Indirect discrimination is demonstrated
through disparate impact evidence and does not require evi-
dence of intent. 209 As it transitioned from a system of legally
enforced racial exclusion to a constitutional democracy with an
express equal protection mandate, South Africa sought to take
every precaution against racial discrimination and thus included
the effects-based standard to ensure that all discrimination
would be addressed.210 This broader standard not only provides
far more protection from discrimination than does the Intent
Doctrine, but is also in compliance with the definition of dis-
crimination set out by CERD.211
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Africa has
discussed the deliberate use of this more protective standard,
and why it is better equipped to combat discrimination than is
the Intent Doctrine.212 He stated that similar to the enactment
of 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as a response to
slavery, the equality provision, quoted in part above, was en-
acted as a response to apartheid.213 However, unlike the drafters
of the 14th Amendment, the South African Constitutional Court
had the benefit of evaluating international law as well as other
nations' domestic laws when drafting this provision.214 The lan-
208 Id. at ch. 2, art. IX, § 3, 4.
209 See Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Brown v. Board of Education: Fifty
Years Later, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 503, 510-11 (2004).
210 See Id. at 509.
211 See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination: South Africa, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/ZAF/CO/3 (2006).
The Committee's most recent Concluding Observations did not make any
mention that it was dissatisfied with the disparate impact standard as it is
applied there. Thus, it can be inferred that the broad application of the stan-
dard is in compliance with the obligations of CERD.
212 See Chaskalson, supra note 209, at 511.
213 Id. at 508.
214 Id. at 509-10.
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guage of the 14th Amendment does not indicate whether it re-
quires proof of intent for a claim of discrimination.215 The South
African Constitutional Court explicitly made indirect discrimi-
nation a violation.216 In drafting this provision, the Constitu-
tional Court specifically considered the Intent Doctrine,
compared it to other standards, and decided to model their Con-
stitution after other countries' examples. 217 In making this deci-
sion, the Chief Justice stated: "It did so because it regarded the
purpose of the prohibition against indirect discrimination to be
the protection of vulnerable groups and not the punishment of
those responsible for the discrimination." 218
The Chief Justice discussed the failures of the United States in
the half century following the decision in Brown v. Board of
Ed., saying that "[d]espite the decision in Brown, neither the
legislature nor the courts have provided effective responses to
issues of race-based poverty and the segregation and discrimina-
tion associated with it, which remain part of life in the U.S."219
Further expanding on such failures, the Chief Justice explained
how unintentional, structural racism persists in the United
States as a result of past discrimination, because it does not take
the remedial approach that other nations take.220 The Constitu-
tional Court decided to follow that remedial approach to ad-
dressing discrimination, which it found necessary because
"[a]bsent a positive commitment progressively to eradicate so-
cially constructed barriers to equality and to root out systematic
or institutionalised under-privilege, the constitutional promise
of equality before the law, and its equal protection and benefit
215 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
216 Chaskalson, supra note 209. at 510-11.
217 Id. at 511.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 505 (referring to Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954)).
220 Id. at 507.
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must, in the context of our country, ring hollow." 221 So, after
considering numerous versions of discrimination standards, in-
cluding the Intent Doctrine, South Africa enacted a progressive
disparate impact standard in order to fully address the lasting
effects of discrimination. This explicit inclusion of indirect dis-
crimination into the South African Constitution not only fur-
thers the purposes of CERD, but is also a direct response to the
failures of the Intent Doctrine.
PART IV: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
In order to advance the human rights ideals of CERD, advo-
cates in the United States should take action promoting a dispa-
rate impact standard for racial discrimination claims. While the
U.S. ratification of CERD was designed to limit its impact on
domestic policy, there are a variety of ways that it can be uti-
lized to advocate for eliminating this anachronistic and ineffec-
tive policy. This section will briefly explore methods of using the
United States' commitment to CERD, however symbolic, to ad-
vocate for the elimination of the Intent Doctrine.
First, attorneys could refer to CERD's disparate impact stan-
dard in their pleadings, urging that it be implemented. While the
precedent of the Intent Doctrine must be followed, citing the
international example would contribute to the movement to
overturn Washington v. Davis through the education of the legal
community. This persuasive authority would call attention to the
United States' deficiencies in discrimination law, so that the le-
gal community is fully educated on this issue. Once attorneys,
judges, and the legal community as a whole thoroughly grasp
that United States discrimination law is not only ineffective, but
also that it does not live up to our international obligations, it
will be far more open to overruling Washington v. Davis.
221 Minister of Fin. v. Van Heerden, 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC), at 141 para. 31 (S.
Afr.).
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The United States Supreme Court Justices have relied on in-
ternational law as persuasive authority, demonstrating that cit-
ing CERD in pleadings could contribute to the elimination of
the Intent Doctrine.222 In discussing the impact of international
law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Justice Ginsburg noted:
Comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to
the task of interpreting constitutions and enforc-
ing human rights. We are the losers if we neglect
what others can tell us about endeavors to eradi-
cate bias against women, minorities, and other dis-
advantaged groups. For irrational prejudice and
rank discrimination are infectious in our world.223
If enough of the legal community is invigorated by the idea
that we should honor our international human rights obliga-
tions, the Intent Doctrine could reach the Supreme Court and
be overturned.
Legislators could also pursue action to implement a disparate
impact standard in place of the Intent Doctrine. If the U.S. Con-
gress were pressured to keep pace with the international com-
munity on this issue, it could effectively overrule the precedent
through legislative means. This could be accomplished simply by
passing legislation setting the constitutional discrimination stan-
dard as disparate impact, or indirectly through legislation that
implements CERD. The latter option, as described above,
would mean that the provisions of CERD would be enforceable
as domestic law, and thus individuals would be able to bring
claims of CERD violations based on its disparate impact stan-
222 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (citing throughout to
international law and foreign sources to explain why the imposition of the
death penalty on juveniles was unconstitutional under the 8th Amendment's
evolving standards of decency).
223 Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States,
Remarks at The American Society of International Law 97th Annual Meet-
ing: The Supreme Court and the New International Law (2003) quoting,
available at http://www.aclu.org/hrc/JudgesPlenary.pdf.
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dard. President Clinton declared through an Executive Order
that:
It shall be the policy and practice of the Govern-
ment of the United States, being committed to the
protection and promotion of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, fully to respect and imple-
ment its obligations under the international
human rights treaties to which it is a party, includ-
ing .. .CERD.224
The public should enforce this "policy and practice" by urging
for legislation that enforces CERD. Through legislative means,
Congress should establish a cause of action for racial discrimina-
tion that can be proved through evidence of racially disparate
statistics. In order to achieve this goal, the legal community, and
the public as a whole, must pressure representatives to make
this a priority.225 This would require a major public education
effort, so that the people of the United States understand the
dire need to address the Intent Doctrine. Should this become a
grave enough concern for its constituents, the issue will become
one that Congress will feel compelled to address. Creating such
legislation is a viable alternative to overturning Washington v.
Davis through the judiciary, but requires the public to urge Con-
gress to address the deficiencies of the Intent Doctrine, and to
act to redress them.
Although CERD's ratification was designed to limit its imple-
mentation in the United States, there are still methods to com-
pel CERD's disparate impact standard through judicial or
legislative means. The legal community, as well as the general
224 Exec. Order No. 13107, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1998).
225 An example of this is the effort made by U.S. Human Rights Network,
which has urged the Senate Judiciary Committee to effectively implement the
provisions of CERD. See The Law of the Land: U.S. Implementation of
Human Rights Treaties: Hearing before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Human
Rights and the Law 111th Cong,. 1st Sess. (2009) (statement of CERD Task
Force, U.S. Human Rights Network).
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public, must be made aware of the threat the Intent Doctrine
poses to international human rights ideals, and take action to
address this issue. Without such action, the United States will
fall further behind the rest of the world by not living up to its
CERD obligations or providing adequate discrimination reme-
dies for its residents.
CONCLUSION
The United States' narrow Intent Doctrine is incapable of
combating modern discrimination and is also well out of compli-
ance with CERD's definition of discrimination. The interna-
tional convention offers broad protections aimed at eventually
eliminating racial discrimination worldwide, and yet the United
States refuses to comply with its very definition. Instead, the
United States ratified the convention as a symbolic gesture to
the international community with no intention of amending the
Intent Doctrine through CERD's established enforcement
mechanisms. Thus, the United States is currently a party state to
the Convention but fails to further its human rights mission.
Until the Intent Doctrine is eliminated, United States anti-
discrimination law will be increasingly outdated and incapable
of addressing the racial discrimination epidemic. The interna-
tional community no longer looks to the United States for gui-
dance on discrimination jurisprudence, as it fails to live up to its
human rights obligations to effectively combat racial discrimina-
tion. Given its sordid history of discrimination and exclusion
based on race, the United States should carefully reconsider its
ongoing application of the Intent Doctrine-particularly in light
of its incapacity to address contemporary racial discrimination,
its inadequacy to promote the human rights ideals promoted in
CERD, and its continuing blight on the United States' reputa-
tion as a nation of equal protection under the law.
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